Emerging Policy and Practice Issues (2018) by Schooner, Steven L. & Berteau, David
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works Faculty Scholarship 
2018 
Emerging Policy and Practice Issues (2018) 
Steven L. Schooner 
George Washington University Law School, sschooner@law.gwu.edu 
David Berteau 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Schooner, Steven L. and Berteau, David J., Emerging Policy and Practice Issues (2018) (2018). GWU Law 
School Public Law Research Paper No. 2018-06; West Government Contracts Year in Review Conference - 
Covering 2017 - Conference Briefs (Thomson Reuters, 2018); GWU Law School Public Law Research 
Paper No. 2018-06; GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2018-06. Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3134857 
This Conference Proceeding is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works by an authorized 
administrator of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact spagel@law.gwu.edu. 
  9-1 © 2018 Thomson Reuters
SeSSion 9
eMeRGinG PoLiCY AnD PRACTiCe iSSUeS
Steven L. Schooner  
Nash & Cibinic Professor of Government Procurement Law 
The George Washington University
David J. Berteau  
President & CEO  
The Professional Services Council
i. AnD noW FoR SoMeTHinG CoMPLeTeLY DiFFeRenT. 
Last year, we understood that 2017 was likely to be one of the least predictable years in modern memory. 
In that regard, 2017 did not disappoint. Unfortunately, nothing we experienced last year makes us terribly 
confident in predicting what is in store for 2018 and beyond. Looking ahead, we are reminded of Derek 
Jacobi’s brilliantly delivered line (which only really makes sense in context) in the cult favorite movie, 
Dead Again (Paramount,1991): “Well I, for one, am [v]ery interested to see [w]hat’s going to happen next.”
A. Facing a Deregulatory Mandate (or, in Practice, A Regulatory Hiatus). 
One of the unexpected major – but at the same time, anti-climactic – storylines for 2017 was the dearth of 
new regulations, a highly irregular occurrence, particularly following eight years of rather frenetic activity 
(particularly with regards to labor and other social policies). Indeed, the lion’s share of the FAR-based regula-
tory activity in 2017 involved rescinding Obama-era labor rules. FAR Final Rule Rescinds Implementation 
Of EO On Labor Law Violations, 59 GC ¶ 351 (removing FAR implementation of EO 13673, “Fair Pay and 
Safe Workplaces,” which, although suspended under a preliminary injunction and class deviation, required 
contractors to disclose certain labor-law violations to CO’s making responsibility determinations. 82 Fed. 
Reg. 51358, 51773 (Nov. 6 & 8, 2017). NCMA’s Executive Director, Michael Fischetti summed it up nicely, In 
Government Contract Management Today, Less is More, Federal Times (November 27, 2017) (emphasis added):
In fact, there is no significant administration-expressed public policy concerning acquisition. There 
have been side comments about the use of time-and-materials contracts and high-visibility program 
negotiations (such as the F-35 and Air Force One programs), but no new policy.
There have been no new procurement rules, either (excepting two at NASA), which is the longest 
time between a new administration taking office and publishing changes to procurement 
rules since the adoption of the FAR. Executive Order 13771 (Jan. 30, 2017) established the 
so-called “Two for One” rule, whereby for every one new regulation issued, at least two prior 
regulations should be identified for elimination. While the ultimate effects of this policy have yet 
to be realized, agencies have thus far appeared to respond by simply not issuing any new 
acquisition-related regulations (meaning none have been cut, either).
If nothing else, a period of relative stability reduces the strain on rule promulgation, implementation, 
training, or, more broadly, transaction costs. See also, EO 13771, Reducing Regulation and Controlling 
Regulatory Costs (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-executive-
order-reducing-regulation-controlling-regulatory-costs/; Richard Pierce, Trump’s two-for-one regulation 
order will lead to court battles, The hill (Feb. 22, 2017) http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/the-
administration/320516-trumps-two-for-one-regulation-order-will-inevitably.
B. The new World of Continuing, Continuing Resolutions, no-Budget Budgeting, And 
The Absence of a Meaningful Budget Cycle. 
Despite some intermittent drama, we survived both 2016 and 2017 without the unproductive and 
painful disruption of sequestration or a government shutdown. This positive note is undercut, however, by 
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mission of Thomson Reuters. Copyright © 2018. Further use without the permission of West is prohibited. 
For further information about this publication, please visit west.thomson.com/store, or call 800.328.9352.
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what appears to be an increasingly common Congressional practice of merely 
kicking the can down the street, and failing to engage in the longstanding 
and familiar appropriation process and schedule. Our fingers are crossed that 
the process doesn’t melt down before the February conference (or afterwards, 
for that matter). As we noted last year, many, including PSC, argued that 
Congress could more effectively allocate its time and energy planning for the 
following (full) fiscal year. Then again, it’s unclear if Congress has agreed 
upon the kind of austerity package necessary to live within the constraints 
of the recently passed Tax legislation. (Fortunately, the White House web 
site was projecting that the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act would “encourage rather 
than discourage investment and … wage growth in America” resulting in 
GDP growth forecasts of nearly 2.5 percent for January 2018. See, e.g., Kevin 
Hassett, Tax Reform: Where have we Been and Where are we Going?). We are 
cognizant of the political grumbling that the odds of a shutdown are greater 
given the stakes in the upcoming 2018 mid-term election cycle, … or that 
the President is willing to shut down the government if Congress fails to 
approve significant funding for the Southern Border Wall, … or that certain 
Congressional leaders are willing to engage in brinksmanship to ensure a 
fix for Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA, which protects the 
so-called DREAMers), but we hope this remains primarily posturing. Expe-
rience teaches us that none of this budget uncertainty supports the kind of 
stable funding that facilitates efficient, long-term investment decisions and 
contractual relationships. 
We applaud the public complaint by Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, 
who, in September, reminded Congress that “CRs impact the readiness of 
our forces and their equipment at a time when security threats are extraor-
dinarily high.” See, Letter to Chairman Thornberry (September 8, 2017) 
https://armedservices.house.gov/sites/republicans.armedservices.house.
gov/files/wysiwyg_uploaded/FY%202018%20CONTINUING%20RESOLU-
TION%20AND%20BUDGET%20CONTROL%20ACT%20BCA%20CAP%20
IMPACTS%20OSD.._.pdf. All too often, federal agencies bravely assert that 
they have learned to manage under a short-term CR. We do not doubt that 
those agencies’ efforts reduce the negative impact of CRs on missions and 
contracts, but we also recognize that they do not eliminate them. Secretary 
Mattis’ letter underscores the lack of validity for such arguments.
C. Still Holding our Breath on Protectionism and infrastruc-
ture. 
Last year, the safe bet was the most dramatic changes we would see in 
2017 would derive from: (1) a resurgence in protectionism (e.g., strengthening 
the Buy American Act and other domestic preference policies) and a dramatic 
disentanglement from regional and global trade agreements; and (2) a massive 
investment in infrastructure (indeed, we were heartened by the campaign 
promise to invest $550B to upgrade the nation’s roads, highways, bridges 
tunnels, railways, airports, transit systems and ports, and maybe even the 
electrical grid and public wireless capacity). Both seem stalled, maintaining 
the status quo. If – in strange karmic fashion – they merely cancel each other 
out, we would be disappointed by the latter, relieved by the former, and con-
vinced that things could have been much, much worse. See, generally, Jean 
Heilman Grier, Feature Comment: Trump Administration Seeks Comments 
On Trade Agreements And Buy American Laws, 59 GC ¶ 266; Administra-
tion Issues ‘Buy American’ Guidance, 59 GC ¶ 219 (joint OMB-Commerce 
Department memorandum providing guidance on EO 13788, Buy American 
© 2018 Thomson Reuters
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and Hire American); U.S. Opens More Procurement To GPA Members Than 
Other Countries, But Data Are Limited, 59 GC ¶ 71.
Nonetheless, we find room for hope here, given the administration’s 
subsequent Executive Order, which directed an assessment of the defense 
industrial base by April 2018. See EO 13806, Assessing and Strengthening 
the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency 
of the United States, 82 Fed. Reg. 34597 (July 26, 2017) (“Modern supply 
chains … are often long and the ability of the United States to manufacture 
or obtain goods critical to national security could be hampered by an in-
ability to obtain various essential components, which themselves may not 
be directly related to national security.”), https://www.federalregister.gov/
documents/2017/07/26/2017-15860/assessing-and-strengthening-the-man-
ufacturing-and-defense-industrial-base-and-supply-chain. This report could 
reinforce Buy American tendencies or, instead, refocus it on real bottlenecks. 
Similarly, infrastructure initiatives have been drafted and may see congres-
sional consideration this year or in 2019.
D. no Talk of insourcing; outsourcing Continues Apace. 
Attendees at this conference understand that the modern era growth in 
service contracting is not a short-term phenomenon. (Increased government 
reliance on contractors has increased at the federal, State, and local levels, 
and our experiences along these lines are mirrored around the world.) Indeed, 
only nine (9) years ago, after a new President waded into the public procure-
ment space largely skeptical of service contracting and, generally, promoting 
an aggressive insourcing initiative, those insourcing efforts quickly stalled, 
and little was done to reverse the multi-decade outsourcing trend that these 
materials have long chronicled. See also, ‘True Size’ Of Federal, Contractor 
Workforces Has Remained Steady Over 30 Years, Report Says, 59 GC ¶ 312 
(Paul Light focuses on various factors that sustain the Government’s increased 
reliance on contract and grant employees, including, among others: the Gov-
ernment’s sluggish hiring process; an aging Government workforce; high 
promotion speed; inflated performance appraisals, easy access to private sector 
employees who fill jobs once held by federal employees; mission-critical skill 
gaps; and a sluggish presidential appointment process). Experience also sug-
gests that surge capacity – the ability for government to increase or, perhaps 
more importantly, decrease contractor workloads or staffing more easily than 
for career civil servants – plays a significant (and, at times, preeminent) role.
Barring dramatic budget and spending restraints, we expect to see the 
outsourcing train quickly pick up steam. Specifically, all signs point to the 
current administration doing nothing to combat – and, indeed, encouraging, 
if not accelerating – a significant exodus of career civil servants (with certain 
agencies, such as the Environmental Protection Agency and State Department 
already leading the pack). While the current administration has not offered 
the type of clearly articulated outsourcing vision promoted by the latter Bush 
Administration (e.g., under the competitive sourcing initiative, initially spear-
headed by OFPP Administrator Angela Styles), the writing on the wall is 
not terribly subtle. Indeed, in March, Executive Order 13781, Comprehensive 
Plan for Reorganizing the Executive Branch, 82 Fed. Reg. 13959, https://www.
federalregister.gov/documents/2017/03/16/2017-05399/comprehensive-plan-
for-reorganizing-the-executive-branch, called for agency reorganization plans 
that should accompany the FY2019 president’s budget request (although as we 
write this, OMB has not confirmed a release date). At the same time, broad 
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based momentum for dramatic, unfettered privatization is not yet apparent. 
House Republicans Push For FAA Air Traffic Control Privatization, 59 GC ¶ 
316; 59 GC ¶ 180(e); President’s FY 2018 Budget Proposal Would Privatize 
Air Traffic Control, Reverse Defense Sequestration, 59 GC ¶ 171.
We generally consider outsourcing – the common practice of government 
reliance on, and use of, supporting contractors – to be a fact of life (rather 
than a sophisticated, calculated, and carefully executed policy decision) and 
prefer to focus our energies on, for example, value-based contractual busi-
ness relationships that permit the government to perform its functions in a 
cost-effect manner or defining and measuring required outcomes. For a more 
skeptical – and to some extent, novel – view on privatization, outsourcing, 
and government reliance on contractors, see Steven L. Schooner, Feature 
Comment: The Well-Reasoned Case For Reversing The Outsourcing Trend: A 
Review Essay Of Jon Michaels’ Constitutional Coup: Privatization’s Threat To 
The American Republic, 59 GC ¶ 319.
ii. neW LeADeRSHiP, VACAnCieS, ReoRGAniZATion,  
PRioRiTieS, ConTinUeD TRAnSiTionS.
A. DoD: A new era at AT&L. 
In early August, the Senate confirmed Ellen Lord, formerly Textron Sys-
tems’ CEO, to serve as the new Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition 
Technology and Logistics USD(AT&L). 59 GC ¶ 251. She replaces Frank 
Kendall, who filled the position during a unique period of stability and in-
herited and evolved Ash Carter’s Better Buying Power (BBP) initiative. By 
the time of this conference, Lord should be Under Secretary for acquisition 
and sustainment (A&S) – instead of AT&L, while other responsibilities are 
carved out under a new Under Secretary of research and engineering (R&E). 
DOD Lays Out AT&L Reorganization, 59 GC ¶ 238 (§ 901 of the FY2017 
NDAA, P.L. 114-328, replaces 10 USCA §133, with new §§ 133a & 133b). 
Lord acknowledged a daunting to-do list on top of any reorganization aspi-
rations, including: implementing more than a hundred acquisition reforms 
from the two most recent NDAAs; revising the DoD 5000 instruction series, 
which governs major acquisition systems; and issuing new instructions for 
business system acquisitions. AT&L Testifies On DOD Acquisition Reforms, 
Reorganization, 59 GC ¶ 372. See also Report to Congress: Restructuring the 
Department of Defense Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Organization 
and Chief Management Officer Organization (August 2017), https://www.
defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Section-901-FY-2017-NDAA-Report.
pdf. Other interesting aspects and individuals to watch in 2018:
•	 Deputy Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan will be joined by DoD’s 
first chief management officer (CMO), John Gibson II, in a position which 
enjoys a bump up from a deputy position; while Kevin Fahey appears in line 
to serve as assistant secretary of defense for acquisition.
•	 A dozen functions, responsibilities, and authorities were proposed for 
Lord’s new position as USD(A&S), including:
•	 Serving as Chief [of] Acquisition and Sustainment;
•	 Supporting USD(R&E) in mission area engineering analyses;
•	 Developing and administering acquisition policy (for weapon sys-
tems and services;
•	 Serving as the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) and decisional 
authority for select major Joint programs;
© 2018 Thomson Reuters
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•	 Aligning Joint/Cross-Service mission capability;
•	 Combining & consolidating common procurements across the 
Services;
•	 Promulgate policy – and monitoring and providing oversight for 
– for logistics, maintenance, materiel readiness, and sustainment 
support, including supply and transportation;
•	 Develop joint weapon systems’ sustainment policy for addressing 
standard and rapid capability development efforts.
•	 Maintaining the industrial base (and providing underlying analy-
sis);
•	 Oversee and guiding nuclear forces modernization and nuclear-
related programs; and
•	 Supporting human capital requirements and training.
•	 USD(R&E) gains cognizance over the Strategic Capabilities Office, the 
Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx), Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (DARPA), the Missile Defense Agency, and a new analysis/
investment strategy cell.
•	 We are intrigued by Lord’s aspiration to dramatically speed acquisi-
tion lead times. Among other things, Lord apparently aspires to: “cut the 
time for early lead procurement by 50 percent, with a future goal of com-
pressing the timeline of request for proposals to contract on major defense 
acquisition programs from two and a half years down to about 12 months.” 
Aaron Mehta, Here’s how Ellen Lord will reduce acquisition time by 50 per-
cent, deFense neWs (December 8, 2017); AT&L Testifies On DOD Acquisition 
Reforms, Reorganization, 59 GC ¶ 372.
•	 A	New,	Improved	DoD	5000	Alternative? The restructuring report’s 
Annex D explains that DoD needs alternative pathways that offer greater 
speed than Major Defense Acquisition Programs (e.g., DoDI 5000.02) and 
Urgent/Emerging Operational Needs (e.g., DoDI 5000.71). The three-step 
alternate path introduces and prototypes new system ideas, often with com-
mercial technologies or modified commercial technologies, and moves them 
toward limited production before committing the DoD to larger scale financial 
outlays.
•	 Step 1 would be initiated by operators defining a need or re-
searchers identifying an opportunity through experimentation, 
war-gaming, technology scouting, etc.; 
•	 Step 2 applies additional resources to procure a limited number 
of units for testing, prototyping, user evaluations, operational 
assessments, etc.; and
•	 Step 3 allows for a deliberate decision point to determine whether 
to invest, divest, continue modifying, or harvest the technology 
and move on.
•	 The	End	of	the	LPTA	Era? We applaud Congressional and DoD cog-
nizance of, focus on, and commitment to ending the scourge of over-reliance 
on, and misuse of, lowest price technically acceptable (LPTA) competitions. 
Yes, yes, there is a place for LPTA procurement, and DoD claims to be well 
on the way to finding (or re-establishing) that sweet spot. See, generally, 
DOD Rarely Uses LPTA For Major Service And IT Contracts, 59 GC ¶ 373, 
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although there is, as of yet, no mandated identification of, or reporting on, 
actual numbers of LPTA contracts. Among other things, Section 813 of the 
2017 NDAA directs DOD to “avoid using [LPTA] source selection criteria 
in circumstances that would deny [DoD] the benefits of cost and technical 
tradeoffs[,]” nor should LPTA procedures predominantly feature in procure-
ments of IT and cybersecurity services, systems engineering, audit services, 
and other knowledge-based professional services. Section 813 directs GAO to 
report annually on DOD’s use of LPTA for contracts over $10 million. After 
more than 13 months, however, DoD has not yet issued DFARS language to 
implement this legislation (but see the discussion of the regulatory hiatus, 
above). See also GAO-18-139, Defense Contracting: DOD’s Use of Lowest Price 
Technically Acceptable Source Selection Procedures to Acquire Selected Services 
(November 2017) www.gao.gov/assets/690/688680.pdf.
•	 More	Work	To	Do	On	Services? DoD’s new leadership has its work 
cut out for it on managing service contracts. But that’s nothing new. GAO-
17-482, Defense Contracted Services: DOD Needs to Reassess Key Leadership 
Roles and Clarify Policies for Requirements Review Boards (August 2017) 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/686889.pdf (To help foster strategic deci-
sion making and improvements in the acquisition of services, USD(AT&L) 
should, among other things, reassess the roles, responsibilities, authorities, 
and organizational placement of key leadership positions, including functional 
domain experts, senior services managers, and component level leads).
•	 A	Resurgence	for	Other	Transactions	(OTA’s)	and	Experimen-
tal	Authorities?	Congress appears to have sent a strong signal that it 
was encouraging flexibility, creativity, innovation, and working around the 
existing framework for many types of projects. See, e.g., Richard L. Dunn, 
PRACTITIONER’S COMMENT: OTAs And The 2018 NDAA, 59 GC ¶ 350, 
discussing, among other things, NDAA:
•	 Section 861, Contract Authority for Advanced Development of 
Initial or Additional Prototype Units;
•	 Section 862, Methods for Entering into Research Agreements;
•	 Section 863, Education and Training for Transactions Other Than 
Contracts and Grants;
•	 Section 864, Other Transaction Authority for Certain Prototype 
Projects;
•	 Section 865, Amendment to the Nontraditional and Small Con-
tractor Innovation Prototyping Program;
•	 Section 866, Middle Tier of Acquisition for Rapid Prototyping and 
Rapid Fielding;
•	 Section 867, Preference for Use of Other Transactions and Experi-
mental Authority; and
•	 Section 868, Prototype Projects to Digitize Defense Acquisition 
Regulations, Policies and Guidance and Empower Users Tailoring 
the Acquisition Process.
See also DoD’s Other Transaction Guide for Prototype Projects (January 
2017), https://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/cpic/cp/docs/OTA_Guide%20(17%20
Jan%202017)%20DPAP%20signature%20FINAL.pdf. For additional insights 
and a more cautionary note, see, e.g., Locke Bell & Anna Sturgis, Feature 
Comment: DOD’s Prototype OTA Guide Offers Insight Into DOD’s Experiment 
© 2018 Thomson Reuters
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In Regulation-Free Acquisition, 59 GC ¶ 155; Richard L. Dunn, Practitioner’s 
Comment, “DOD Guide for Other Transactions for Prototypes—Fundamentally 
Flawed,” 59 GC ¶ 19; FAA Needs To Improve Oversight Of ‘Other Transaction’ 
Agreements, 59 GC ¶ 290; Report Number: ZA2017098, DOT and FAA Lack 
Adequate Controls Over Their Use and Management of Other Transaction 
Agreements (September 2017), www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/508-OTA 
FinalRepot 9-11-17.pdf.
•	 DCAA	Gets	Help	 (Or	Competition):	The	Rise	of	Third-Party,	
Qualified	Private	Auditors. We’re intrigued to see that DoD (and, more 
broadly, government) reliance on private sector auditors appeared to get a 
dramatic kick start from Congress. While we are hesitant to wager that the 
NDAA’s legislative initiative will eliminate (or, for that matter, dramatically 
reduce) the current audit backlog by October 1, 2020, something along these 
lines seemed long overdue. (The GAO report, below, indicates that, while 
DCAA has cut in half its backlog of contractors’ incurred cost proposals, 
DCAA did not meet its goal of eliminating its backlog by FY 2016, nor is it 
likely to do so by the end of FY18.) 
The road ahead, smoothed with supplemental, private sector support, 
nonetheless appears complicated, initially with the need to set standards for 
“qualified private auditors.” Conversely, we see few impediments ensuring that 
audit firms remain free of conflicts of interests; nor do we anticipate difficul-
ties in imposing strict nondisclosure requirement. We are also, conceptually, 
pleased with what appears to be a Congressional clarification of the CO’s 
broad authority on cost-related issues, and hope that the legislation restores 
a more healthy balance in the CO-auditor relationship. See also, President 
Signs FY 2018 NDAA, 59 GC ¶ 380 (David Berteau opining favorably on § 
803, which “permits independent, third-party auditors to help the Defense 
Contract Audit Agency reduce the incurred-cost backlog and mitigate the 
negative impact that the backlog has on the government and government 
contractors.”). See also, more broadly, Agencies Must Take Additional Actions 
To Close Contracts, 59 GC ¶ 313; GAO-17-738, Federal Contracting: Additional 
Management Attention and Action Needed to Close Contracts and Reduce Audit 
Backlog (Sept. 2017), www.gao.gov/assets/690/687497.pdf (GAO reported that 
DoD, HHS, DHS, Justice, and State all lacked critical elements that would 
help track and oversee contract closeout processes—the number and type of 
contracts to be closed, where the contracts were in the process, and goals and 
performance measures).
One additional nugget in the above-referenced GAO report caught our 
attention, and we applaud GAO for recognizing that “closing out contracts is 
not the highest priority for contracting officers that are charged with award-
ing and administering contracts for products and services to meet mission 
needs.” And, not surprisingly, these CO’s complained that their “ability to 
focus attention on contract closeout was affected by resource constraints, 
including workforce challenges and sequestration….” GAO then proffered 
the perfectly reasonable proposition that contract closeout “is a critical step 
to ensure the government receives the goods and services it purchases at the 
agreed upon price and, if done in a timely manner, provides opportunities to 
utilize unspent funds for other needs.” What GAO neglected to acknowledge, 
however, is the impact that DCAA’s backlog has had on government claims 
and litigation, particularly with regards to statutes of limitations and, of 
course, both the government’s and the private sector’s access to knowledge-
able personnel armed with contemporaneous knowledge of relevant events.
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•	 Rising	Thresholds. The increase of two thresholds merit brief dis-
cussion. 
•	 The increase of the Simplified	Acquisition	Threshold (SAT, 
in NDAA § 812) from $150,000 to $250,000 seems significant – 
more in terms of how it will impact the higher volume of lower 
value procurements. (Of course, FAR 2.101 already permitted a 
range significantly higher thresholds, e.g., $300,000 for purchases 
outside the U.S., $750,000/$1.5 million (in and outside the U.S.) 
for contingencies, etc.) We also expect that, at the margins, this 
will have a dramatic impact – and could prove either a curse or 
a windfall – for small businesses, depending upon their unique 
situations, markets, and customers. See also, Micropurchase And 
Simplified Acquisition Thresholds Raised For Hurricane Harvey 
Response, 59 GC ¶ 278.
•	 While we applaud the increase in the threshold for obtaining certi-
fied cost or pricing data – from $500,000 to $1 million (in NDAA 
§ 813) – but we think that threshold still remains far too low. We 
remain confident that a serious research effort quantifying the 
return on investment versus the transaction costs of demanding 
such data at such a low threshold would provide a valuable public 
service (and, hopefully, lead to a more pragmatic floor).
•	 The	Generational	Scandal:	Fat	Leonard	Continues	to	Lead	the	
Pack. Sadly, many professionals in our field place themselves into age brack-
ets around the defining scandals of their formative years. Dating back to the 
Truman Committee’s claims that Curtiss-Wright company had been supplying 
defective aircraft engines to the Army Air Force, high profile scandals in the 
modern era included everything from the Ill Wind scandal (see, e.g., Andy 
Pasztor’s iconic, When The PenTaGon Was For sale), to the Bradley Fighting 
Vehicle (which spawned a serious book and a funny movie, The PenTaGon 
Wars), and even the DIVAD debacle (leading to voluntary resignation and 
vindication of the NASA administrator and the Quotidian defective audit/
malpractice tort suit brought by General Dynamics against DCAA). Early in 
this millennium, we witnessed a former OFPP administrator (David Safavian) 
and an Air Force career civilian (Darlene Druyun) sentenced to jail time. 
But nothing prepared us for the scope, scale, and sustained wreckage as-
sociated with the Fat Leonard (Glenn Marine)-Navy scandal. If you’re late to 
the party on this one, we recommend the fascinating Washington Post graphi-
cal meta site: https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/investigations/
seducing-the-seventh-fleet/, highlighting, among other things: (1) the scope 
of the carnage, with more than 440 active-duty and retired military person-
nel – including about 60 admirals – having come under scrutiny for possible 
violations of military law or ethics rules; 18 individuals already have pleaded 
guilty in federal court; at least ten more face federal criminal cases in San 
Diego; five admirals have been disciplined or admonished by the Navy (and 
one already pled guilty and was sentenced to 18 months in prison); and at 
least five sailors have been charged under military law; and (2) some of the 
bribes taken by Navy personnel, including Lady Gaga and lion KinG tickets, 
prostitutes, alcohol, cash, travel (airfare, hotel), etc. Many bemoan that the 
fallout will result in a “lost generation” in the Navy’s leadership ranks. See, 
e.g., John Cordle, “Fat Leonard” Scandal Fallout Will Damage the Navy for 
Years, ProCeedinGs (December 2017) (investigation may be without parallel 
in complexity and scope; event will leave a black mark on the Navy for the 
© 2018 Thomson Reuters
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foreseeable future; key positions remained unfilled for long periods; Navy is 
experiencing gaps that will take years to fill and problems that will remain 
unsolved for even longer).
•	 The	809	Panel	Endures	(and	Thrives). We’re not sure what the 
future holds for DoD’s Section 809 panel, but they remained busy, active, and, 
frankly, entertaining, throughout 2017. (Recall that NDAA Section 809 for 
Fiscal Year 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-92, required the Secretary of Defense to 
establish an advisory panel on streamlining and codifying acquisition regu-
lations. The massive study panel has been working on five target areas: (1) 
establishing and administering appropriate buyer and seller relationships; (2) 
improving the functioning of the system; (3) ensuring the continuing financial 
and ethical integrity of defense procurement programs; (4) protecting the best 
interests of DoD; and (5) eliminating any regulations that are unnecessary 
for the purposes described.) Currently, in addition to an informative web 
page, https://section809panel.org/, the panel has begun producing (since 
August), what appears to be a monthly, topical (10-15 minute) podcast series, 
Bold Bites, which we heartily recommend. See https://section809panel.org/
media/bold-bites-podcast/. See also, DOD’s § 809 Panel Issues Interim Report 
On Streamlining Regulations, 59 GC ¶ 160; section809panel.org/wp-content/
uploads/2017/05/Sec809Panel_Interim-Report_May2017_FINAL-for-web.pdf 
(including five main sections: adapt at the speed of a changing world, lever-
age the dynamic defense marketplace, allocate resources effectively, simplify 
acquisition, and enable the workforce).
B. A Familiar Face at GSA. 
In early December, the Senate confirmed Emily Murphy as the Adminis-
trator of the General Services Administration (GSA). Murphy is no stranger 
to GSA, having previously served as GSA’s chief acquisition officer (CAO). 
More recently, Murphy served as senior counsel for the House Committee 
for Small Business, where she worked with Mick Mulvaney, who currently 
serves as both the Director of Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and 
Acting Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). In 
her December 12 opening remarks, Murphy articulated her priorities as: “[e]
thical behavior, reduced duplication, increased competition, and improved 
transparency.” She emphasized that “fixing our underlying systems will re-
duce barriers to entry for small and innovative contractors” and that “GSA 
should … facilitate the adoption of shared services.” See https://www.gsa.
gov/about-us/newsroom/speeches/speeches-by-the-administrator/opening-
remarks-by-us-general-services-administrator-emily-murphy-december-12-2017. 
C. Still Waiting at oFPP. 
Crickets. Just crickets.
iii. SPeCULATinG on PRoCUReMenT SPenDinG:  
ReCoVeRY, BRieF ReSURGenCe … BUT WHAT’S neXT?
A. Good news? After the Bottom, Upward Motion. 
Attendees should be cheered to learn that 2017 followed the not-insig-
nificant procurement spending increase in 2016, which, of course, reversed 
what had been perceived (until recently) as a seven-year plateau-and-decline 
in federal procurement spending. Revised data, however, appears to dispel 
the familiar and widely-accepted storyline of a straight-line decline between 
FY2008 and FY 2015, instead isolating the decline to the FY 2010-2015 pe-
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riod. (And more on this below.) Even armed with the adjusted historical data, 
only the most optimistic prognosticators anticipated that federal procurement 
spending would again rise above the $500 billion dollar so quickly. But here 
we are (with a new chart this year to spice things up).
Now that spending is no longer falling, can we assume that the last two 
years indicate a trend in the other direction? We are not yet convinced. For 
now, the chart (above) and the table (below) summarize the post-millennial 
procurement spending cycle. At first glance, it appears that the post-recession 
spending plunge has ended. Now the question is whether spending will sta-
bilize, increase, or, of course, drop again. Here, this chapter continues past 
practice, taking a broader view of the spending picture to redefine the pie by 
including grant spending. In that context, the 2017 overall spending layouts 
– combining contracts and grants – appear quite robust, indeed, presenting 
the second highest total in this century (although, of course, these numbers 
have not been adjusted for inflation).
Federal Procurement and Grant SPendinG FY2001-2017* 
 (In Billions of Dollars)
Fiscal 
Year
Procurement	
Spending
Grant	Spending
Procurement	&	Grant	
Spending (Combined)
2017 $508.7* $662.7* $1,171.4*
2016 $473.7 $668.2 $1,141.9
2015 $438.2 $618.9 $1,057.1
2014 $444.9 $603.6 $1,048.5
2013 $462.6 $521.7 $984.3
2012 $519.7 $542.2 $1,061.9
2011 $538.1 $571.7 $1,109.8
2010 $559.0 $622.8 $1,181.4
2009 $539.2 $692.2 $1,231.5
2008 $540.2 $420.7 $960.9
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2007 $469.3 $430.2 $899.5
2006 $430.5 $490.0 $920.5
2005 $391.2 $441.7 $832.9
2004 $346.1 $450.1 $796.2
2003 $318.0 $493.7 $811.7
2002 $264.1 $406.3 $670.4
2001 $223.0 $330.8 $553.8
*FY 2017 figures reflect an estimate based upon preliminary reporting. See www.USASpending.
gov.  
Also, the total procurement spending amounts reported above, for every year, 2008-2016, were 
revised – in some years, significantly (e.g., approaching 10 percent) – when compared to last 
year’s USASpending data.
B. The Post-Millennial Trend Line, extrapolations and  
observations. 
Regular attendees of this conference are familiar with this chapter’s 
coverage of the post-millennium federal procurement spending trend. The 
post-millennial binge (before the 2008 economic crisis) was significant not 
only for its longevity but for its size. To review (and amend and clarify), par-
ticularly in light of the constantly revised data:
•	 In Fiscal Year 2001, federal procurement spending rose, from $219 
billion to just over $223 billion. The following years, in 2002 and 2003, we 
witnessed 18-20 percent spending increases. (Yup, federal procurement ex-
panded from $219B to $318B over three years!)
•	 After steady increases in the middle of the decade, we reached a four-
year (or, if your prefer, five-year) plateau of sorts, where federal procurement 
spending stabilized in the $538-559 billion range from Fiscal Years 2008 
through 2011 (or, in the alternative, the $520-559 billion range from Fiscal 
Years 2008 through 2012). 
•	 The revised data now suggests that FY2010, rather than 
FY2008, marked the high point of the spending binge. (But what 
a binge it was: from $219B in FY2000 to $559B in FY2010!) 
•	 In 2009, we experienced the first decrease in federal procurement 
spending for well over a decade (but, in retrospect, that seems 
less significant to the extent that it was immediately reversed by 
a brief jump to the all-time peak of $559 billion in FY 2010).
•	 An interesting historical anomaly here is that the FY09 explo-
sion in grant spending – a one-year increase of 65 percent – led to 
FY09 being the peak year for federal expenditures (including both 
grants and contracts).
•	 The post-2008 fluctuations and decreases were statistically insig-
nificant (and it took a number of years for the data to catch up) and now, in 
retrospect, appear to have, instead, been more of a plateau. Indeed, much 
of the post-2008 panic seemed either premature or an over-reaction, as, for 
a number of years, the only macro-level spending effect was an absence of 
growth or expansion. 
•	 In FY12, we finally experienced the first sustained, dramatic decline in 
spending and, then, a plunge below the (oh-so-dramatic) $500 billion threshold 
in 2013. But, again, that decline was dramatic: by the time we reached bot-
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tom (two years later), at $434B, annual federal procurement spending had 
dropped more than $120 billion below the 2008-2011 plateau. (Last year, we 
reported this as a $100B drop, but revised data demonstrated it was even 
more severe!) In reality, most of the spending generated from the Budget 
Control Act of 2011 (which paved the way for sequestration) was directed at 
contract spending, not on military or civilian pay
•	 The last two years saw a sixteen percent increase in procurement spend-
ing (more than erasing two years’ worth of dramatic decreases), bringing the 
number back into the range of the FY2013 spending level. This increase was 
experienced at both defense and non-defense agencies, and we expect final 
FY2017 data to be in line with this trend. The reality is that, for both defense 
and non-defense funding through FY2017, the Budget Control Act (BCA) caps 
were as much the funding floor as they were the ceiling. That may no longer 
be true, based on expectations for further non-defense cuts in the President’s 
FY2019 budget.
•	 Get ready for some more movement. To the extent that both Congress 
and the economics community are projecting a deficit in the $1.5 trillion range 
over the next decade (as a result of the recent tax legislation), something will 
have to give. Of course, the big question – and one we’re not yet prepared to 
answer – is when?
•	 It’s worth paying attend to grants! Consistent with the trend this 
chapter has previously reported, in 2017, grant spending exceeded procure-
ment spending, as it has for fifteen of the last seventeen years. And the gap 
appeared to be widening (although it appears to have contracted last year). 
Still, since FY2014 (or over the last four years), the government expended a 
third as many more dollars through grants than through contracts.
•	 Of course, since December 2014, with OMB’s implementation of the 
Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, and Audit 
Requirements for Federal Awards, 2 CFR 200 (commonly called 
the “Uniform Guidance”), the lines (and similarities) between con-
tracts and grants – as well as their oversight regimes – continue 
to ebb, flow, and, at times, blur.
•	 Belatedly, but not surprisingly, agencies are increasingly acknowl-
edging that the same challenges that bedevil contract administra-
tion, post-award management, and oversight manifest themselves 
with regard to agency grants. See the discussions of contract data 
quality and contract management, below.
•	 A number of grants management-related requirements were elimi-
nated pursuant to the Presidential Management Agenda regula-
tion reduction initiative. See, Mick Mulvaney, OMB Memorandum 
M-17-26, Reducing Burden for Federal Agencies by Rescinding 
and Modifying OMB Memoranda (June 15, 2017), available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/
memoranda/2017/M-17-26.pdf. The memorandum, inter alia, 
disbanded the Council on Financial Assistance Reform (COFAR) 
and eliminated: M-12-01, Creation of the Council on Financial 
Assistance Reform (October 2011); M-14-17, Metrics for Uniform 
Guidance (2 C.F.R. 200) (September 2014); and Controller Alert, 
Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Numbering Schematic 
(December 2016). 
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C. The Future of Procurement Data: Something Better? A 
Global Standard? 
Last year, we highlighted the evolving global conversation on open con-
tracting data and bemoaned that the United States, historically a leader on 
procurement transparency, is not driving the train on this and, arguably, is 
lagging behind. As the annual process of chronicling revisions to previously-
reported data reminds us, most of the federal government’s procurement data 
must be taken (and dispensed) with a grain of salt. This year we have more 
information, but not much of it is encouraging. See, e.g., DATA Act Reporting 
Not Always Complete Or Accurate, GAO Finds, 59 GC ¶ 348, GAO-18-138, 
DATA ACT: OMB, Treasury, and Agencies Need to Improve Completeness and 
Accuracy of Spending Data and Disclose Limitations (November 2017). Among 
other things, GAO found:
•	 Much more needs to be done if the DATA Act’s promise of improving 
the accuracy and transparency of federal spending data is to be fully realized. 
In particular, we need better and more complete data on subcontracts as 
well as better linking of contract obligations to the appropriations accounts 
from which funds flow.
•	 Based on a projectable sample representing (more than 90 percent) of 
all Beta.USAspending.gov records, data accuracy—measured as consistency 
between reported data and authoritative agency sources—differed sharply 
between budgetary and award records. Between 56	to	75	percent	of	 the	
newly-required budgetary records were fully consistent with agency 
sources. In contrast, only between 0	to	1	percent	of	award	records were 
fully consistent.
•	 With regard to contract awards, while the primary flaw in the data 
related to Primary Place of Performance (and this apparently derives from 
an FPDS-NG inconsistency with USASpending.Gov), GAO also estimated 
that the Award Description data element contains inconsistent information 
in 49-60 percent of awards contained in the database.
•	 Treasury does not sufficiently identify or disclose known limitations 
and error sources affecting data quality (e.g., in its FAQ or banner). Increased 
transparency about known data quality issues would help users make more 
informed decisions about how to interpret the data.
And, of course, the same problems pervade the grants process. Kenneth 
J. Allen, Feature Comment: A Report From The Grant Front, 59 GC ¶ 282 
(full implementation of the DATA Act is not quite on schedule, and given the 
enormity of the task, no one is really surprised). 
For more on this topic, see generally, Open Contracting Data Standard 
at http://standard.open-contracting.org/latest/en/. This is a much more 
far-reaching effort than simply improving the Federal Procurement Data 
System (FPDS) or USASpending data resources. The Open Data advocates 
envision global standards on what we generally refer to as a single point of 
entry site – e.g., our www.acquisition.gov site, managed by GSA. But the open 
contracting data initiative aspires to encourage nations to publish data for 
each step of the contracting process, create summary records for an overall 
contracting process, and make available re-useable objects, such as tender 
(or bid or proposal) information, line-items, amounts, milestones, documents 
etc. You can read more about the U.S. Government’s Open Data initiative at: 
www.data.gov and https://project-open-data.cio.gov/. See also the Sunlight 
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Foundation’s Open Data Policy Guidelines, at https://sunlightfoundation.
com/opendataguidelines/. And, of course, these issues correspond with a 
widening public and oversight community frustration with reduced federal 
government transparency, particularly (but by no means exclusively) with 
regard to agency web pages and historical government publications, policy 
documents, and other information.
iV. RAnD’S RePoRT on DoD PRoTeSTS AT THe  
GoVeRnMenT ACCoUnTABiLiTY oFFiCe (GAo)
In the FY17 NDAA, Congress called for a “comprehensive study on the 
prevalence and impact of bid protests on DoD acquisitions” and systematic 
collection and analysis of information on bid protests and their associated 
contracting outcomes. As a general rule, we welcome these types of research 
efforts, particularly to the extent they facilitate decision-making based on 
data and facts rather than anecdotes and urban myths. By now the RAND 
report – which we strongly recommend – should be widely circulated. Mark 
V. Arena, et al., Assessing Bid Protests of U.S. Department of Defense Pro-
curements: Identifying Issues, Trends, and Drivers (December 2017), https://
www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2356.html. A few passages caught 
our attention, but these are just the tip of the iceberg:
•	 Perception	and	Perspective: No one should be surprised that per-
spectives on the bid protest system varied greatly between DoD personnel 
and the private sector. DoD personnel expressed a general dissatisfaction[, 
… perceiving] that contractors have an unfair advantage in the contracting 
process by potentially impeding timely awards with bid protests [… and] that 
the federal government allowed too many “weak” allegations in a protest and 
that contractors had too much time to protest, delaying procurements. In 
contrast, private-sector representatives strongly supported the bid protest 
regime because they viewed it as providing transparency to the contracting 
process and holding the government accountable for following the law and 
its own solicitation procedures.
•	 Protests	Remain	Relatively	Rare: RAND found a steady increase 
in bid protest actions at GAO between FY 2008 and FY 2016; indeed, protest 
activity for both DoD and non-DoD agencies approximately doubled, and that 
growth appeared indifferent to changes in DoD spending and contracting. 
Overall, the number of DOD contracts and contract spending declined from 
FY 2008 to FY 2016, a trend counter to DoD bid protest volume. Still, the 
overall percentage of contracts protested is very small—less than 0.3 
percent.
•	 Not	All	Protests	Are	Vexatious	 or	Predatory. The stability of 
the bid protest effectiveness rate over time—despite the increase in protest 
numbers—suggests that firms are not likely to protest without merit.
•	 No,	Virginia,	DoD	Doesn’t	Develop	Requests	for	Proposals	Pri-
marily	Around	Protest	Avoidance. The RAND team specifically asked DoD 
personnel to what extent the specter of a bid protest influenced acquisition 
decisions in terms of how requests for proposals (RFPs) were structured and 
evaluated. The short answer was that DoD, generally, and its CO’s, specifically, 
did not consider the prospect of receiving a bid protest to be a top priority as 
they developed their RFPs. Rather – and this should surprise no one read-
ing these materials – the RFP structure and evaluation mechanisms derive 
primarily from Congressional mandates (e.g., the Competition in Contracting 
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Don’T USe oUTLine LeVeLS FoR TeXT. iT Won’T TRAnSLATe 
To wl. USe PARA STYLe.
Act, the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act, the Small Business Act, the 
Buy American Act, and, of course, the steady stream of NDAA provisions). 
•	 Meaningful	Debriefings	Deter	Protests: RAND recommended that 
DoD adopt a debriefing process similar to the Air Force’s extended briefing 
process. Their research suggested that the worst debriefings were character-
ized as being skimpy, adversarial, and evasive or as failing to provide required 
reasonable responses to relevant questions. As a result – in desperation – un-
successful offerors protest to obtain government documents that delineate the 
rationale for the contract award. The RAND team concluded that, frequently, 
too little information and evasive/adversarial debriefings will lead to a bid 
protest.
•	 Is	There	a	Place	for	a	Small	Claims	Model	(or,	like	the	Boards	
of	Contract	Appeals,	Accelerated	or	Expedited	Review)? RAND found 
surprising that roughly eight percent of GAO protest actions and nearly four 
percent of protest cases at the U.S. Court of Federal Claims (COFC) con-
cerned procurements with a declared value under $0.1 million ($100,000). For 
RAND, that raised an interesting policy question: whether the costs to the 
government to adjudicate these protests exceed the value of the procurements 
themselves and thus are not cost-effective? Accordingly, RAND recommended 
that streamlined processes be considered for protests under $0.1 million (or 
some other suitably low value)—perhaps employing processes analogous to 
how traffic tickets are adjudicated in traffic court or how cases are handled 
in small-claims court.
We’ll also be watching the fallout from Section 827 of the FY2018 NDAA, 
which creates a DOD pilot program to determine if the Department should 
implement a “loser pay” fee for GAO bid protest. Not only could this provision 
make it harder to hold DoD accountable for following the law and procure-
ment procedures, but it also raises the question of how DoD will determine 
what costs the loser must pay, as well as the analytical basis for those costs 
(given that the federal government has no CAS-compliant means to determine 
fully-burdened costs).
See also, GAO Bid Protest Sustain Rate Drops In FY 2017, 59 GC ¶ 355 
(FY 2017 filings declined to 2,596, down seven percent from 2,789 in FY 
2016, and down slightly from 2,639 in FY 2015; much closer to the FY 2014 
number of 2,561).
V. CYBeRSeCURiTY WiLL ReMAin on eVeRYone’S MinD
Kudos to the Government Contacts Year In Review Conference Team 
for carving out cybersecurity as a regular topic at this conference (tomor-
row morning). The general issue reminds us that allocating contractual 
responsibility alone rarely serves all of the government’s needs. The one 
thing that’s become increasingly clear in this space, other than the need for 
ongoing, consistent vigilance, is that the government and the private sector 
are all in this together. Moreover, it’s not just a challenging, complicated 
topic, but its status as a moving target without clear, easy-to-implement 
government guidance keeps the anxiety level high. See, e.g., House Passes 
DHS Cybersecurity Overhaul, 59 GC ¶ 385 (re-designating the Department 
of Homeland Security’s National Protection and Programs Directorate as 
the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)); Franklin 
C. Turner & Alexander W. Major, Feature Comment: Lurking In The NIST—
Why Federal Contractors May Be Misreading Their Cybersecurity Safeguard-
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ing Requirements, 59 GC ¶ 306; DPAP Issues Guidance On Implementing 
NIST Cybersecurity Standards, 59 GC ¶ 301; DSB Makes Suggestions To 
Improve DOD Cybersecurity, 59 GC ¶ 12 (and the DSB Task Force Report 
on Cyber Defense Management is available at www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/
Cyber_Defense_Management.pdf). Practitioners would also be well-served 
by considering the year-long series, John Chierichella & Townsend Bourne, 
Feature Comment: Achieving Cyber-Fitness In 2017: Part 6—Potential Li-
abilities And Putting It All Together, 59 GC ¶ 363; Part 5-Cyber Incident 
Reporting And Response, 59 GC ¶ 275; Part 4-Subcontracts, Joint Ventures 
And Teaming Agreements, 59 GC ¶ 177; Part 3-Proving Compliance And The 
Role Of Third-Party Auditors, 59 GC ¶ 87; Part 2-Looking Beyond The FAR 
And DFARS-Other Safeguarding And Reporting Requirements, 59 GC ¶ 43; 
and Part 1-Planning For Compliance, 59 GC ¶ 25 (For many Government 
contractors, … the focus in 2017 [was] cybersecurity in general, and specifi-
cally compliance with [DoD’s] final rule for safeguarding covered defense 
information before the December 31 deadline. See 81 Fed. Reg. 72986.... 
[Looking ahead,] Contractors that become familiar with the applicable 
cybersecurity requirements, develop a robust cybersecurity program, and 
regularly exercise and test their cybersecurity controls are better positioned 
to take advantage of safe harbor provisions and avoid common compliance 
pitfalls.). 
The main topic here is DFARS	compliance, which Under Secretary Lord 
has said means having a plan (there was a DFARS class deviation issued on 
this in December. See, https://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/policy/policyvault/
USA003939-17-DPAP.pdf. DoD reports that it recognizes the cost and com-
plexity for contractors in meeting NIST regulations. During her December 
7 Senate testimony regarding cybersecurity compliance with January 1, 
2018, deadlines, Under Secretary Lord stated: “We said that clearly the only 
requirement for this year is to lay out what your plan is.” Contractors know, 
however, that eventually DoD will need to be able to determine “compliance” 
more clearly than whether a “plan” exists.
Vi. THe eLePHAnT in THe RooM: AFTeR THe BARGAin, 
YoU neeD To MAnAGe THe ConTRACT (oR THe GRAnT, 
oR, ULTiMATeLY, THe BUSineSS ReLATionSHiP)
This year, we were pleased to see several Inspectors General acknowl-
edge the dirty little secret that undermines so many of the government’s 
procurement policies and aspirations. No matter how much attention the 
government heaps upon the contract formation stage – planning, generating 
requirements, publicizing, soliciting, competing, evaluating, negotiating, 
drafting and awarding contracts – inadequate post-award contract manage-
ment, administration, and oversight resources frequently imperil anticipated 
outcomes in government contracts. Some highlights (and, sadly, recurrent 
themes) from the reports include:
•	 DoD contracting officers do not always appoint contracting officer’s 
representatives (CORs), appointed CORs are not always adequately trained, 
contracting officials do not always develop adequate quality assurance sur-
veillance plans or never developed them at all, quality assurance surveillance 
plans do not reflect current contract requirements, and CORs do not always 
maintain supporting documentation. Moreover, not all CORs follow the over-
sight procedures established in the quality assurance surveillance plans to 
monitor contractor performance.
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•	 At the State Department, grants management practices did not com-
ply with Department requirements, and inadequacies appeared regarding 
the monitoring and documentation of contractor performance pertaining to 
contracts and foreign assistance programs. The IG pointed to staffing short-
ages, poor training, high turnover, and competing priorities, as well as CORs 
serving without proper training or proper designations.
•	 At the Department of Justice (DOJ), human capital constraints, decen-
tralized contracting functions, and a lack of adequate monitoring frameworks, 
such as training and formal policies, often impede the Department’s oversight 
of contractors. The IG astutely observed that this oversight challenge should 
be of particular concern to DOJ, given that, in FY2017, more than a quarter 
(27 percent) of DOJ’s contracts were time and material (T&M) and labor-hour 
contract awards, used only when it is impossible to estimate accurately and 
considered to be high risk contract types, because they provide no incentive 
for the contractor to control cost. 
This problem is neither new nor novel, but we applaud the attention being 
paid to the problem and encourage agencies to attempt to address these con-
cerns by investing in, and allocating, appropriate resources to this important 
government function. See, generally, Contract Management Still A Key Chal-
lenge, Agency IGs Report, 59 GC ¶ 367, citing DoD IG, Top DoD Management 
Challenges Fiscal Year 2018, media.defense.gov/2017/Nov/20/2001846364/-
1/-1/1/FY%202018%20MANAGEMENT%20CHALLENGES_11172017.
PDF (pages 21-23); oig.state.gov/system/files/fy_2017_department_manage-
ment_challenges_-_508_version_for_publication.pdf (pages 8-12); and oig.
justice.gov/challenges/2017.pdf (pages 21-23).
